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Introduction
Empathy is the ability to infer and share the feelings, intentions, and goals 
of other persons.1 It provides the basis for our extraordinary capacity to help 
others, including strangers we may never meet, without interest in personal 
benefit. Its extent has been controversial, but recent studies in neuroscience, 
empirical psychology, and primatology support a highly empathic under-
standing of human nature. This view overturns the so-called “Darwinian” 
paradigm prevalent both in popular imagination and academic disciplines.2 
The “Darwinian” account—in quotes because distant from Darwin’s own 
express views3—holds that “man is a wolf to man” (homo homini lupus); that 
individuals are self-maximizing and manipulative, even when seemingly kind 
to others (a common joke among psychologists: “scratch an ‘altruist’ and 
watch a ‘hypocrite’ bleed”); and that “Mother Nature” rewards the strong 
and discards the weak (“the devil take the hindmost”).4 As Richard A. Posner 
writes, “Darwin’s picture of nature is bleak; it is dog eat dog in virtually a 
literal sense; the adaptionist process that produced us is genocidal.”5
 But recent studies support a different picture, a kinder one, in which per-
sons are naturally attuned to one another, cannot help feeling what others feel, 
and spontaneously reach out to others in need. In The Age of Empathy, Frans 
de Waal calls for “a complete overhaul of assumptions about human nature.”6 
The empathic paradigm is a “radical new view,” writes Jeremy Rifkin in The 
Empathic Civilization, “with radical implications for the way we understand 
and organize our economic, social and environmental relations in the cen-
turies to come.”7 Both Rifkin (an economic and social theorist) and de Waal 
(a primatologist) look to empathy as an important source of moral progress. 
Rifkin argues that human empathy emerged over time, in conjunction with 
cultural developments (e.g., communications technology), and harbors vast 
potential. He defines “civilization” as “the detribalization of blood ties and 
the resocialization of distinct individuals based on associational ties,” and 
empathy is the psychological mechanism that makes this possible.8 Its growth 
on a global scale helps us set aside local ties and provincial loyalties, which 
often lead to violence and cruelty, in favor of wider association and shared 
consciousness of common fate.9
 De Waal is similarly concerned. He claims that “[t]he greatest problem 
today, with so many different groups rubbing shoulders on a crowded planet, 
is excessive loyalty to one’s own nation, group, or religion.”10 Fully aware of 
the extraordinary violence of which humans (and other primates) are capable, 
he suggests that even a modest increase in empathy may help us avoid brutal 
acts against one another. Empathy is part of human nature, de Waal reminds 
us. Its basic and pervasive forms are far less complex than many think, and it 
provides a reservoir from which we may draw to cope with a conflicted social 
world.11 “If I were God,” de Waal writes, “I’d work on the reach of empathy.”12
 Maia Szalavitz (science journalist) and Bruce Perry (child psychiatrist) 
concur with de Waal and Rifkin, claiming we need “an empathy epidem-
ic.”13 They insist “[e]mpathy underlies virtually everything that makes society 
work—like trust, altruism, collaboration, love, charity. Failure to empathize is 
a key part of most social problems—crime, violence, war, racism, child abuse 
and inequity, to name just a few.”14 They believe that empathy, or the lack 
thereof, characterizes entire cultures and that we can deliberately cultivate 
this capacity.15 For support, they point to the “Roots of Empathy” school 
program, established by Mary Gordon, for solid evidence that we can en-
hance empathy, and they argue that developing this one capacity may foster 
enormous social change.16
 Others, such as Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom (both psychologists), 
disagree. Pinker writes brilliantly on the historical decline of violence in The 
Better Angels of Our Nature, but considers empathy too selective and arbitrary 
to be of much use. Studies show that empathy is mercurial: people respond 
differently depending on mood, recent experience, and whether they recog-
nize the other person as familiar or foreign.17 Empathy can also conflict with 
other important social values, such as fairness, prompting us to dismiss the 
legitimate claims of strangers in favor of those eliciting concern.18 Pinker 
concludes that “[t]he problem with building a better world through empathy, 
in the sense of contagion, mimicry, vicarious emotion, or mirror neurons, is 
that it cannot be counted on to trigger the kind of empathy we want, namely 
sympathetic concern for others’ well-being.”19 Hoping to extend empathy 
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to complete strangers is “utopian in the worst 20th century sense,” Pinker 
writes, “requiring an unattainable and dubiously desirable quashing of human 
nature.”20 He suggests we instead rely on reason to move beyond empathy: 
“The ultimate goal should be policies and norms that become second nature 
and render empathy unnecessary.”21
 Bloom similarly emphasizes limits. Specific, identifiable suffering triggers 
spontaneous empathic response (that may or may not be helpful), but suffer-
ing of anonymous groups often escapes notice.22 The tragedy in Newtown, 
Connecticut (14 Dec. 2012), in which twenty school children were murdered, 
illustrates his point. People empathized deeply with victims, sending gifts that 
townspeople could not use (literally a warehouse full of toys), despite pleas 
that charity be sent somewhere else. Meanwhile other children, some 20 mil-
lion, nightly go to bed hungry without eliciting public concern.23 Because 
more attuned to individual cases, empathy appears unsuited for dealing with 
large social problems, and Bloom sides with Pinker. He writes that
[i]f a planet of billions is to survive, however, we’ll need to take into 
consideration the welfare of people not yet harmed—and, even more, 
of people not yet born. They have no names, faces, or stories to grip 
our conscience or stir our fellow feeling. Their prospects call, rather, for 
deliberation and calculation. . . . [E]mpathy will have to yield to reason 
if humanity is to have a future.24
Bloom acknowledges that human beings are profoundly empathic, but like 
Pinker does not trust it, and he urges us to set it aside in favor of rationality.
 This is a genuine debate, and there may be much at stake: given an em-
pathic understanding of human nature, how can we secure moral progress 
and moderate social conflict? This essay addresses the issue from a Pragmatic 
perspective. The central argument is that James and Dewey provide an al-
ternative approach, one that avoids the above dilemma but addresses the 
concerns of each side. The Pragmatists integrate empathy and rationality in 
a distinct concept and practice of “sympathetic reason,” one that (with de 
Waal and others) draws on empathy as a valuable resource. The Pragmatists 
never bought into the so-called “Darwinian” view of human nature, and their 
account is compatible with—indeed, thoroughly anticipates—the new em-
pathic paradigm. But the Pragmatists also recognized the limits of empathy 
and sought to render it more intelligent in practice (thus minimizing the 
wayward tendencies that concern Pinker and Bloom).
 To develop this argument, section 1 briefly explores recent empirical stud-
ies in neuroscience, in particular the discovery of mirror mechanisms, which 
provide the physiological basis of empathy. It also offers a brief taxonomy of 
different forms of empathy to show how it works and pervades much of our 
experience. The point is that the new empathic paradigm (which Pragma-
tists share) is grounded solidly in human biology, and empathy may prove a 
valuable source of moral progress. Nevertheless, Bloom and Pinker are right 
to be concerned. There are situations in which empathy goes awry, and rely-
ing on empathy alone would be naïve. But this does not mean that empathy 
should be left behind. It requires guidance, and section 2 turns to the work of 
James and Dewey to show how that is possible. Rather than choosing between 
empathy and reason, the Pragmatists combine them in practice, methodi-
cally, and this section shows how that works in a general way. Section 3 then 
focuses on James’s specific diagnosis of why we often fail to empathize with 
other ways of life (or other groups, as de Waal and Rifkin would have it) and 
his response. James advocates a specific but broad social reform, urging us 
to cultivate our sense of the inherent worth of others’ lives, of their dignity, 
and to appreciate it even (or especially) when apt to be dismissive. This not 
only allows us to share and vicariously participate in the lives of others (a 
treasured good in its own right), but also encourages us to be responsive to 
others especially in times of need. This effort extends not only to individuals 
we actually encounter, but also their associated groups, other members of 
which we may never come across.
1. Empirical Foundations and Forms of Empathy
Recent discoveries in neuroscience demonstrate that human beings are not 
only capable of empathy, but that empathic awareness and basic understand-
ing of others is automatic and pervasive. The story, which is truly dramatic, 
begins in the 1990s when Giacomo Rizzolatti and his team studied neural 
activity and planning movements in macaque monkeys. Their research indi-
cated that neurons in the F5 region of the prefrontal cortex activate prior to a 
monkey’s reaching out to grasp an object (a peanut). This was expected: it is 
cognitive preparation for subsequent movement. But the team was shocked 
when a subset of F5 neurons fired when a monkey observed another monkey 
reach for an object, even though the observer made no subsequent move-
ment. The team identified this as a “mirror mechanism,” a discharge whose 
purpose is unrelated to planning.25 Instead, “discharge generates an internal 
representation of the movement” with complementary functions, such as 
motor learning and understanding of observed action.26 “Understanding” 
here means “the capacity to recognize that an individual is performing an 
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action, to differentiate this action from others analogous to it, and to use this 
information in order to act appropriately.”27 These monkeys, it turns out, 
operate with a rudimentary “theory of mind”: they attribute interiority to 
others and purpose to observed action.
 Subsequent studies indicate that humans also possess a number of mir-
ror mechanisms. These are involved not only in successful imitation and 
understanding, but also in emotional experiences, such as disgust, and in 
witnessing others’ pain.28 Discovery of mirror systems indicates that human 
beings are biologically “wired for empathy.”29 According to Daniel Siegel, 
these systems are fundamentally involved in human empathy and emotional 
resonance, and they allow us (as Marco Iacoboni emphasizes) to have auto-
matic empathy: “Mirror neurons allow us to grasp the minds of others not 
through conceptual reasoning but through direct simulation. By feeling, not 
by thinking.”30 They also support higher forms of empathic experience. As 
Murray Smith writes, “[m]imicry of basic actions and emotions may scaffold 
the imagination, including the empathic imagination, of more elaborate, 
finely-specified states of mind.”31 “Preverbal and automatic” basic forms of 
empathy “are not replaced by the advance modes but continue to operate 
along with them.”32
 Empirical studies show that empathic experience is truly pervasive, tak-
ing not only different forms, but forms with variations, sometimes appearing 
alone or in combination with others.33 A fairly simple form, one especially 
attractive to advocates of empathy as a source of moral progress, is contagion. 
This is the rapid spread of feeling from one person to another and fully cap-
tures the mirror dynamic.34 People literally share an emotion, and this may 
take a group form, as with spectators at a sporting event or participants in a 
protest. Contagion is the swift expression of a biological mechanism that al-
lows us to intuitively grasp the minds, and feel the feelings, of other persons, 
commonly accomplished through physical and emotional mimicry in which 
there is a strong physiological component.35 This is automatic, and it begins 
very early. As Marc Hauser writes, “when the child unconsciously mimics 
another’s facial expression of sadness or delight, she automatically creates a 
coupling between her expressions and her emotions.”36 Consequently, “when 
young children see others experiencing a particular emotion, they will simul-
taneously feel something similar. Empathy moves as a form of contagion, 
like a game of emotional tag.”37 This entanglement of bodily expression 
and emotion means that we do not need to deliberately infer, or puzzle out, 
what others feel “inside.” We directly experience their feelings’ vivid physi-
cal expression. The coupling of emotion and expression provides a medium 
through which individuals and whole groups continuously and directly affect 
one another, without ever “thinking” about it. This medium accompanies us 
always—we are doing it much of the time, not just once in a while—and it 
renders other, higher forms of empathic engagement possible.
 One such higher form is empathic projection. Here one imaginatively puts 
oneself in the shoes of another person and explores how it feels to experience 
that person’s world.38 It essentially asks: “How would you feel if you were the 
one [abused, tortured, ignored, etc.]?” and the experience may profoundly 
affect the imagining participant.39 From a moral point of view, this may 
also be quite valuable. As Amy Coplan writes, “[e]xperiencing the other as 
a version of ourselves in many situations is a good thing, and it’s usually far 
better than experiencing the other in purely instrumental terms.”40 But we 
must be careful. Projection “makes us more likely to become emotionally 
over-aroused and, consequently, focused solely on our own experience” rather 
than on the experience of someone else.41 It may also lead to mistaken at-
tribution, leading us to presume others feel as we do when they may in fact 
feel very differently.42
 Beyond projection lies a significantly more deliberate and demanding 
form, perspective-taking. This is the ability to imagine what the world looks 
like according to someone else, to “see what they see,” given their situated-ness 
in the world.43 Perspective-taking is balanced toward higher, slower cogni-
tive function instead of lower, faster automatic response in order to capture 
a more accurate grasp of the other’s point of view.44 The experience is revela-
tory but is likely to be an affectively diminished one.45 One may understand 
(and feel), for example, something of the humiliation, pain, and outrage a 
person subjected to racial prejudice feels, but not feel it with the same hot 
intensity as the other.
 It is tempting to think we can at best toggle between projection and 
perspective-taking, but we sometimes combine features of both. The more 
abstract perspective of the other is fused with the more immediate emo-
tional perspective of the first person, encouraging us to take the view of the 
other with the same (or similar) emotional conviction (perhaps recruiting 
the powerful mechanism of contagion) with which we experience our own 
perspective. The values, needs, and preferences of others may become just as 
salient (and in some cases, even more so) as our own, and indeed, they may 
become ours as we share experience with them in an ongoing way.46
 This process of identification also paves the road for more inclusive iden-
tification. We comprehend not only the situation of individuals, but that of 
their associated groups.47 Having genuinely empathized with a victim of some 
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form of violence, we may generalize—indeed we are moved to generalize—from 
the individual to others similarly situated. As Hoffman writes, “[o]ne not only 
feels compelled to help the group in the present but becomes committed to 
act on their behalf beyond the situation and often over an extended period 
of time and at great personal cost.”48 This need to help the individual, and in 
some cases entire groups, is empathic concern. The intense emotion diminishes 
over time, and may all but disappear or only occasionally return, but the com-
mitment to help endures. Moreover, this sort of empathic response does not, 
as Pinker and Bloom suggest, require us to treat billions of strangers as fam-
ily. Rather, personal experience with specific individuals establishes a bridge 
to concern for whole groups—the members of which are largely unknown, 
merely imagined, and may well yet be unborn—that commit us to not only 
reach out spontaneously, but commit to long-term courses of social conduct.49
 Finally, empathic perspective-taking sometimes opens the door to what 
Stephen Darwall refers to as a sense of “being with” another person, that is, 
being together.50 Whereas empathic concern generally has to do with relative 
strangers, this is constitutive of intimacy associated with loved ones and close 
friends (whom we may come to think of as family). This is mutual empathy, 
an experience that Ingvar Johanssan describes as “intentional mirror infinity,” 
where, as Kay Mathiesen writes, “we are not just perceiving things from our 
own perspective, but are also aware of the other’s perspective and experiences 
at the same time.”51 As Darwall describes it, “friends and lovers are usually 
less concerned with mutual accountability than they are with responding to 
one another’s needs, feelings, and concerns, whether these are justifiable or 
not.”52 It is the sense in which two people genuinely share experience in an 
ongoing way; it is both present and prospective; and it is animated by warmth 
of interior understanding for and from another person.53 It is comparatively 
rare, hard to come by as James points out, but also not the form on which 
de Waal and Rifkin rely for their view. Mutual empathy is of course selective 
and must remain so. But it may be expanded somewhat (as James will suggest 
below) and other forms (projection, perspective-taking, empathic concern) 
may be cultivated more broadly. To see how, we turn to the Pragmatists.
2. Sympathetic Reason
James and Dewey do not use the term “empathy,” offering instead a varied 
and nuanced understanding of “sympathy.” James’s early treatment is brief, 
but suggestive, and Dewey carries it further. In The Principles of Psychology, 
James first dismisses the argument that sympathy is not native to human 
nature. His contemporaries argued that sympathy originates in the results of 
rapid calculations of outcomes, and that these acts had become sufficiently 
habitual to be indistinguishable from instinct. This is an example of the so-
called “Darwinian” view of human nature—seemingly selfless (or altruistic) 
acts are in fact selfish—but James would have none of it:
Some forms of sympathy, that of mother with child, for example, are 
surely primitive, and not intelligent forecasts of board and lodging and 
other support to be reaped in old age. Danger to the child blindly and 
instantaneously stimulates the mother to actions of alarm or defence. 
Menace or harm to the adult beloved or friend excites us in a corre-
sponding way, often against all the dictates of prudence.54
James concludes that sympathy is instinctive,55 is rooted in human biology, 
and proposes that it may be due to selection of random variation.56
 But James is also clearly aware of its limits. In everyday life, sympathy 
must compete with other instincts, and sympathy is “peculiarly liable to in-
hibition.”57 Anticipating Pinker’s observations, he writes that fear or disgust 
may check the impulse toward sympathetic aid, as when the priest and the 
Levite notoriously refused to assist the traveler in the story of The Good Sa-
maritan. James suggests the Samaritan admirably overcame other impulses, 
permitting sympathy to express itself. The story also shows that the instinct 
may be modified—essentially “tuned up” or “dialed down.” James writes: 
“[H]abits, reasoned reflections, and calculations may either check or reinforce 
one’s sympathy; as may also the instincts of love or hate, if these exist, for the 
suffering individual.”58
 Given a mixed endowment of native instinct and development, James 
(like Pinker and Bloom) fully understood that sympathy alone is sometimes 
not enough. Reflection—as pause, as a calling up of other instincts, emotions, 
and specific memories of past occasions—is also needed:
Man has a far greater variety of impulses than any lower animal; and 
any one of these impulses, taken in itself, is as “blind” as the lowest 
instinct can be; but, owing to man’s memory, power of reflection, and 
power of inference, they come each one to be felt by him, after he has 
once yielded to them and experienced their results, in connection with 
a foresight of those results.59
James does not simply set aside instinct in favor of reason. “Reason,” James 
argues, “can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an im-
pulse is an impulse the other way.”60 The role of reason is to shape native 
propensity. It makes inferences regarding relations, calls up memory, and sets 
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 imagination loose—in this case, to educate sympathy—so that various im-
pulses may come into play, conflict, modify one another, and ultimately result 
in desirable action. Sympathy gains foresight in light of other considerations, 
and intelligent conduct, according to James’s model, is action occurring after 
this kind of inclusive deliberation has a chance to occur.61
 Dewey’s view of sympathy tracks and extends James’s account. Like James, 
Dewey recognizes sympathy as a “genuine natural instinct” (he similarly did 
not buy into the “Darwinism” of his day). His early writings also anticipate 
current views of empathy in which complex forms emerge from more rudi-
mentary ones: “Sympathy has its origin in what is termed resonance or con-
tagion of feeling. There is a psychical atmosphere as well as a physical, and 
one living in this atmosphere absorbs and reflects it. Laughter and crying are 
both ‘catching.’ We unconsciously reproduce the feelings of those about us; 
we take on their mood unaware.”62 But this is only the “basis” of sympathy: 
“For sympathy, we must not only have this feeling ourselves, but we must 
recognize, in addition, that it is the experience of someone else”; it “involves 
distinction as well as identification”; and, fully anticipating both Hoffman 
and Darwall, “[w]e must not only take their life into ours, but we must put 
ours into them. Sympathy, as active interest, thus becomes love and a spring 
to action.”63 But for Dewey, sympathetic experience is something vitally more; 
it is the basis of full self-realization in company with others:
[T]he nature of sympathy is such that growth in individuality is a nec-
essary accompaniment of growth of universality of feeling. Sympathy 
identifies others with one’s self, and at the same time distinguishes them 
from one’s self. It enables us to realize our true nature, which is univer-
sal personality, by widening our life till it becomes as comprehensive as 
humanity, and at the same time deepens our own distinct individual-
ity. Such a sympathy can, of course, recognize no distinction of social 
rank, wealth, or learning, or anything that tends to cut off one person 
from another.64
Dewey’s claim to “universal personality” may seem ambitious, but modern 
psychology and neuroscience support it. As discussed in section 1, empathic 
perspective-taking gives rise to genuinely shared experience in which the self 
retains its individuality while taking on the perspective and point of view not 
only of specific others, but of the groups to which they belong. This capacity 
is rooted in mirror mechanisms that support automatic processes facilitating 
more basic forms of empathy, such as contagion. These in turn are recruited 
by higher-order cognitive abilities to take the perspective of others and their 
associated groups. Thus truly, as Dewey claims, “[s]ympathy widens our 
interest in consequences and leads us to take into account such results as af-
fect the welfare of others; it aids us to count and weigh these consequences 
as counting for as much as those which touch our own honor, purse, or 
power.”65 Moreover, Dewey is right to suggest that our sympathy may be “as 
comprehensive as all humanity.” Pinker and Bloom deride the idea that we 
may empathize with large numbers of strangers, persons we have never met 
and may even be unborn, but we often do empathize with large groups of 
strangers, and many people commit careers and/or other large portions of 
their lives to helping them.
 The real problem, Dewey observes, is that spontaneous expression of sym-
pathy tends to be partial. Anticipating the concerns of Pinker and Bloom, 
he writes that “[i]t rarely extends beyond those near to us, members of our 
own family and our friends. It rarely operates with reference to those out 
of sight or to strangers, certainly not to enemies”; it tends to be superficial, 
taken in by conspicuous cases of immediate concern; and worse still, acts 
that have become habitual and practices that form part of everyday experi-
ence are likely to be ignored entirely.66 Dewey (like James) therefore argues 
that sympathy must be balanced by other dispositions in order to rationalize 
sympathy. “More ‘passions,’ not fewer, is the answer.”67
To check the influence of hate there must be sympathy, while to ratio-
nalize sympathy there are needed emotions of curiosity, caution, respect 
for the freedom of others—dispositions which evoke objects which 
balance those called up by sympathy, and prevent its degeneration into 
maudlin sentiment and meddling interference.68
The idea of “reason” here, as with James, is not a separate faculty in contrast to 
passion, but rather “the happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions, such 
as sympathy, curiosity, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit—to 
follow things through—circumspection, to look about at the context, etc., 
etc.”69 Reason is itself a resulting disposition, or attunement, that incorpo-
rates all of these tendencies, each balancing, widening, and circumscribing 
one another in various ways, depending on the circumstances. As sympathy 
is “rationalized” (or rendered more reasonable) by other dispositions, dispo-
sitions traditionally associated with reason (such as impartiality and calcula-
tion) are in turn balanced by sympathy, giving us sympathetic reason. In this 
combination, sympathy is harnessed (or directed), but the motive force, the 
passions that move us (empathic concern), remain as drivers of individual 
and collective conduct.
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 Sympathetic reason is expressed through ongoing adjustment, modifi-
cations that may be directed very specifically at the limits of spontaneous 
sympathy identified above. For example, we might become aware of the 
fact that certain extraneous circumstances—such as being in a hurry or a 
bad mood—affect our tendency to help others, and find this troubling. It 
vexes us precisely because we are able to engage in empathic projection and 
perspective-taking, which Dewey aptly calls “dramatic rehearsal.”70 This in-
volves exploring the consequences of various acts, both for self and others—an 
extraordinary exercise in empathic imagination:
We foreknow how others will act, and the foreknowledge is the be-
ginning of judgment passed on action. We know with them; there is 
conscience. An assembly is formed within our breast which discusses 
and appraises proposed and performed acts. The community without 
becomes a forum and tribunal within, a judgment-seat of charges, as-
sessments and exculpations. Our thoughts of our own actions are saturated 
with the ideas that others entertain about them, ideas which have been 
expressed not only in explicit instruction but still more effectively in 
reaction to our acts.71
“Conscience” is possible because we know so much about the feeling, thoughts, 
intentions, and goals of other persons. What the recent empirical work on em-
pathy contributes to the Pragmatic account is empirical support for how this 
is truly possible, that is, how we really are able not only to infer the feelings, 
thoughts, and intentions of others from our and their point of view, but also 
value their perspective as much as (or more than) our own. When this happens, 
we deliberate not only for ourselves, but truly on behalf of others as well and 
in their best interest (not just covertly our own).72
 Dramatic rehearsal issues in judgments, for example, the need to be more 
responsive to those in need despite being in a hurry. We may then identify 
and follow a rule, like “always stop when someone asks for help,” at least for a 
time, to lend strength to empathic concern in these contexts, thus re-balancing 
our set of habits and associated impulses by “tuning up” empathic response 
(making it more automatic) in a specific context. Sympathetic reason, of 
course, may also lead us to moderate an empathic impulse, such as when we 
are in a hospital and interests of fairness dictate waiting our turn even when 
very concerned about the health of a loved one. It may similarly lead us to 
take a rather critical view of ourselves when reflecting on how often we fail 
to empathize with less obvious, but no less worthy, cases of misfortune (e.g., 
Bloom’s example of malnourished children). So rather than merely reacting 
to situations spontaneously when they happen to occur, we may deliberately 
seek them out and further educate ourselves about how best to respond to 
such crises.73 One of the valuable lessons of the Sandy Hook Elementary 
School incident may be developing better mechanisms for actually helping 
victims and seeing that outpourings of donations are not wasted should such 
tragedy strike again.74
 What is distinctive about the Pragmatic method is that it sets aside the 
usual (and rather arbitrary) distinction between reason and emotion and 
instead harmonizes them in deliberate practice, or rather sees rationality as 
an ongoing and more or less intelligent reshaping of habitual expression of 
instinct, through cultivation of a greater variety of impulse and habit in the 
actual situations we experience.75 Of course, empathic response may go awry 
in practice, but these experiences, taken as pedagogical, call attention to prob-
lems that may be addressed in time through deliberate and creative response. 
The solution, from a Pragmatic perspective, is deliberate reform, not arbitrary 
dismissal of our native propensity to empathize with others. Moreover, on 
this model there is no need to think of persons as strictly selfish or altruis-
tic. People may help without interest in reward (genuine altruism), but this 
does not mean that helping is not rewarding (or stranger still, shouldn’t be 
rewarding). Once we see our way past the faux “Darwinian” selfish paradigm, 
we can dispense with the idea that actions have to be one or the other; they 
can be both, or more accurately, they can be mutually beneficial, mutually 
rewarding—shared experiences that help make life more meaningful in as-
sociation with others.
3. Blindness, Recognition, and Dignity
In addition to this Pragmatic approach, or general method, James also ten-
ders specific advice for cultivating empathic experience more broadly. In On 
a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, James extols our ability to experience 
the feelings, values, and ideals of others, but emphasizes how often we fail to 
do so.76 Sympathy is rare not because we are intrinsically selfish or indifferent 
to others (we aren’t and now recognize this as more faux “Darwinism”), but 
because we are practical creatures subject to such pressing demands that we 
are apt to dismiss others out of hand or judge them precipitously.77 To redress 
this blindness, which James calls “the trait in human character most likely 
to make the angels weep,” he proposes a principle of conduct: “It absolutely 
forbids us to be forward in pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms of 
existence other than our own; and it commands us to tolerate, respect, and 
indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own 
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ways, however unintelligible these may be to us.”78 Consistent with his dis-
cussion of impulse, James recommends we cultivate an attitude—a passion 
really—to esteem, indulge, and respect others. This tendency extends not 
only to other individuals, but also to the groups of which they are members, 
and the way of life they share. We do this not by separating emotion from 
reason, but by introducing and harmonizing impulses so as to make them 
more reasonable, more intelligent in practice, more likely to result in morally 
desirable conduct. Rather than setting it aside (Bloom), or moving beyond it 
(Pinker), we put empathy to work and enjoy the fruits of its labors.
 James then supports this principle by explaining more precisely what 
is worthy of our admiration, tolerance, and respect in others. Invoking his 
experience in a planned community near Chautauqua Lake, James observes 
that human struggle is everywhere; if we pay attention, it is profoundly evi-
dent in the lives of everyone around us pursuing, fighting for, and suffering 
to achieve various ideals for themselves and loved ones. James describes this 
recognition as “lives leveled up as well as leveled down”—leveled down with 
respect to outward difference and show (social class, etc.), but raised to equally 
high status in having rich inner meaning and personal significance.79 What is 
worthy, James poignantly concludes, “is the common fact that here we are, a 
countless multitude of vessels of life, each of us pent in to peculiar difficul-
ties, with which we must severally struggle by using whatever of fortitude 
and goodness we can summon up.”80
 Although James does not invoke the term, he offers nothing less than a 
basis for human dignity, for what it is about every individual human life that 
warrants respect and tolerance, even where those lives are opaque or provoke 
outsiders’ condemnation. To expose this “common fact,” James lingers over the 
lives of the poor, of those for whom many of us lack understanding, sympathy, 
and (perhaps especially) admiration. James remarks that we raise monuments 
to generals but not ordinary workers because we suppose the former have ide-
als, but assume the latter have none.81 Yet “ideals are relative to the lives that 
entertain them. To keep out of the gutter is for us here no part of conscious-
ness at all, yet for many of our brethren it is the most legitimately engrossing 
of ideals.”82 The point is not which ideals one has, but that one existentially 
struggles, endures, and suffers in realizing them. Every person is capable of 
this, which calls for a cautious and tolerant attitude. Where manifest, it invites 
admiration and further demands our respect, or even “grudging recognition” 
when we don’t identify with them (or their pursuits).83
 Highlighting the dignity of others and cultivating attendance to it at-
tunes us (even predisposes us) toward features of others that trigger empathic 
awareness, facilitates perspective-taking and, in some cases, elicits empathic 
concern and mutual empathy. Emphasizing common dignity diminishes 
awareness of individual and group boundaries and discourages precipitous 
judgment and indifference, helping us to set aside the tribal prejudices that 
worry both Rifkin and de Waal (among others). As Jonathan Haidt observes, 
“[y]ou can make people care less about race by drowning race differences in 
a sea of similarities, shared goals, and mutual interdependencies.”84 Attuning 
ourselves to human dignity invites attention to what humans share, opens 
space for discussion and development of common goals, and allows the real-
ity of obscured interdependence to emerge.
 A key to this Pragmatist approach is avoiding the idea that personal at-
tachment to groups is necessarily harmful. It isn’t. As Haidt suggests, our 
capacity to participate in groups “is one of the magical ingredients that made 
it possible for civilizations to burst forth, cover the Earth, and live more 
peacefully in just a few thousand years.”85 Potential problems arise when a 
group (or small number of groups) accrue such control that they are capable 
of imposing themselves on their members and outsiders.86 The answer, to 
paraphrase Dewey on impulse, is more groups not fewer, more opportunities 
to share experiences with those differently situated in a variety of different 
ways of living. Multiple-membership curtails the influence of any one group 
and expands horizons. It allows us to enjoy the deeply rewarding benefits of 
membership (of belonging) without being held captive or growing excessively 
blind by virtue of exclusive participation. It is worth recalling that James, in 
his discussion of the self in Principles, defines the self in part as committed 
to multiple social groups, each of which reveal a part of one’s character, and 
each of which delimits the others.87 And Dewey similarly recognized that in-
dividuals are always members of many groups, and that participation (where 
not exclusive) may contribute to the expression and integration of the self.88
 Deliberately cultivated along these lines, empathic experience is not a 
matter of sacrifice, altruism, balancing, or trade-offs, but a virtuous spiral in 
which personal experience expands through appreciative experience of others, 
and vice versa, in an ongoing manner.89 This is a source of distinctly human 
enjoyment, particularly when it reaches the heights of mutual empathy. It also 
renders us more receptive to others, especially when vulnerable, injured, or 
otherwise in need. This is the distinctive, extraordinary, and often poignant 
experience of someone (or a group) directly facing us and asking for help. 
In these situations our attitudes may be dramatically changed by empathic 
concern, and we may be jolted into action, doing anything we can for those 
calling out to us. In these experiences, where we genuinely help others, both 
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they and we are truly better off. We also benefit because caring is intrinsi-
cally rewarding,90 and this is a reciprocal condition, for each of us, at some 
time, and perhaps many times, deeply crave and need understanding and 
help from others. As James writes, “[w]here would any of us be, were there no 
one willing to know us as we really are or ready to repay us for our insight by 
making recognizant return? We ought, all of us, to realize each other in this 
intense, pathetic, and important way.”91 The struggle for a meaningful and 
happy human life, James reminds us, involves above all a need for others—a 
lifelong need to share, as well as for care and occasional help.
4. Conclusion
This essay explored recent studies in neuroscience, empirical psychology, and 
primatology that support an empathic understanding of human nature, one 
that Pragmatists pioneered but had been displaced by a selfish paradigm—
faux Darwinism. A Pragmatic approach to empathy benefits considerably 
from these recent studies, but also shows how we may put empathy to better 
use, enjoy its benefits, and curb its excesses. It shows that the way forward 
lies not in choosing between empathy and reason for moral progress, but in 
combining them and cultivating specific forms of empathic experience. This 
is practical advice that hopefully moves us a bit closer to that “Age of Empa-
thy” envisioned by Jeremy Rifkin—a world in which “our better angels” are 
deliberately brought forth.
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